

CEP PRESENTATION FOR
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RICHARDSON

15 MARCH 1973

NAVY HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.

NAVY review(s) completed.

SECRET

**CEP PRESENTATION
FOR
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RICHARDSON**

15 MARCH 1973

DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL
ON 1 MAR 78 TO UNCLASSIFIED
ON 1 MAR 83

SECRET

**ISSUE: HOW WELL DOES FORCE
PLANNING PROCESS RESPOND
TO STRATEGY GUIDANCE ?**

SECRET

ESSENCE OF DOD POLICY GUIDANCE FOR
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

WITH OUR ALLIES, MAINTAIN FORCES
TO DETER A THEATER CONVENTIONAL WAR INVOLVING
THE USSR OR CHINA.

PRIMARY EMPHASIS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
EUROPEAN DEFENSE.

SHIFT PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO ALLIES
FOR DETERRING OR FIGHTING SUB-THEATER
CONFLICTS.

SECRET

3 R

GUIDANCE FOR SIZING GP FORCES WITHIN FISCAL CONSTRAINTS

1. PLAN FORCES FOR A NATO CONFLICT (OR A WAR AT SEA WITH THE SOVIETS) WHILE ASIA IS QUIESCENT.
2. IN ADDITION, PLAN A RESERVE OF NOT MORE THAN 2 DIVISIONS, 2 AIR WINGS, AND 2 CARRIER GROUPS.
3. IF, WHILE PROTECTING A MINIMUM NATO CAPABILITY OF 10 DIVISIONS, MORE FORCES ARE NEEDED TO AID AN ALLY VS A CPR OR NON-CPR ATTACK, PROVIDE THOSE FORCES, IF THEY CAN BE ACCOMMODATED IN A BALANCED PROGRAM.

NET IMPACT OF GUIDANCE

SUBSTANCE:

1. DEFEND NATO
2. AVOID GROUND WARS IN ASIA

PROCEDURE

1. SPECIFIC, PRESCRIPTIVE GUIDELINES
2. BASED ON WORST CASE
3. OTHER CASES FORCED TO "LESSER INCLUDED" CATEGORY

% MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF EQUAL COST SYSTEMS
IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS

	MIDEAST	CHARACTERISTICS
NATO	CRISIS	<u>BUT NO SCENARIOS</u>
<u>SCENARIO</u>	<u>SCENARIO</u>	
SYSTEM A	70-85 %	20-30 %
		30-40 %
SYSTEM B	30-45 %	60-70 %
		70-85 %

NATO-RELATED PROGRAM DECISION OPTIONS PROVIDED TO SECDEF

FY 74-78 (\$ BILLIONS)

LARGEST ADDITION LARGEST DECREASE
TO POM TO POM

1. LAND FORCE ISSUES

(SUCH AS: SIZE OF MARINES,
TYPES OF ARMY DIVISIONS
SIZE OF ARMY RESERVE, ETC.)

+3 -5

2. TACAIR ISSUES

(SUCH AS: NUMBER OF
CARRIERS, MUNITIONS
FUNDING, A-9/10 BUY, ETC.)

+7 -5

3. NAVAL FORCE ISSUES

(SUCH AS: SURFACE ESCORT
BUYS, SONOBUOYS, PATROL
HYDROFOIL, ETC.)

+2 -3

TOTAL +12 -13

IMPACT OF PLANNING PROCEDURES

- DECENTRALIZATION MEANS MANAGEMENT BY EXCEPTION.
- THROUGH ISSUE PAPER PROCESS, SECDEF FOCUSES ON ABOUT 5% OF FORCES.
- PRESCRIPTIVE PLANNING CAN DISTORT FORCE PLANNING.

NATO DOMINANCE CAUSES:

- HIGH HARDWARE COSTS
- ADVERSE THIRD COUNTRY PERCEPTIONS
- SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT
- LOSS OF FLEXIBILITY FOR MORE PROBABLE CONTINGENCIES

PRESCRIPTIVE GUIDANCE CAUSES:

- FORECLOSED OPTIONS
- TACTICAL THINKING STEREOTYPED
- IMPEDIMENTS TO INNOVATION
- VOYEURISM ENCOURAGED

CEP GUESS AS TO ENVIRONMENT
OF THE 1970'S

- FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY ARE ENCOURAGING
 - SALT, MBFR, ETC.
- BUT INSTABILITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES PERSIST, e.g.
 - CHINESE SUCCESSION
 - YUGOSLAV SUCCESSION
 - SINO/SOVIET HOSTILITY
 - EXTRA LEGAL ACTIONS
 - VIETNAM/SEASIA
 - INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT
- NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN SOVIET OR CHINESE OBJECTIVES OR REDUCTIONS IN POWER

USES OF MILITARY IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1970'S

FORCES SERVE BOTH AS AN INSURANCE POLICY
IN CASE OF WAR AND AS LEVERAGE IN FOREIGN POLICY.

INSURANCE :

NATO
LESSER INCLUDED CASES

LEVERAGE :

NATO

- DANGER OF FINLANDIZATION
- FLEXIBILITY vs SOVIETS ON FLANKS

PACIFIC

- BALANCE OF POWER AMONG FOUR COUNTRIES

MIDEAST

- ISRAEL
- OIL

LATIN AMERICA

12 R

SUMMARY

CURRENT PLANNING STILL EMPHASIZES

- SINGLE 20 YEAR OLD NATO SCENARIO
- SUDDEN EUROPEAN WAR FIGHTING
- LESSER INCLUDED CASE ASSUMPTIONS

CONSEQUENCES OF NATO CONFLICT ARE STILL MORE SERIOUS THAN OTHER CONTINGENCIES:

HOWEVER:

- PROBABILITY OF NATO CONFLICT IS RELATIVELY LOW
- PROBABILITY OF LOWER ORDER CONFLICT IS HIGHER
BUT FISCAL CONSTRAINTS LEGISLATE AGAINST
STRUCTURING FOR THAT

**ISSUE - HOW MUCH SHOULD NATO DOMINATE
FORCE PLANNING?**

ALTERNATIVES:

**SPECIFY SCENARIOS OTHER THAN FULL SCALE
NATO CONFLICT**

AND/OR

SPECIFY GENERAL FORCE CHARACTERISTICS

FORCE EVALUATION BY POTENTIAL SCENARIOS (RANK ORDERING)

SCENARIO	Major Wars supported by USSR/CPR	Subversion or wars supported by USSR/CPR	Great uncertainty w/major power implications	Minor 3rd Power Problems	Non-Military Actions
FORCE	NATO	Soviet/China Conflict	Vietnam/ S.E. Asia	Korea	Yugoslav Succession Israel - Arabs
LAND BASED GROUND FORCES					Indonesia
SEA BASED GROUND FORCES					South American Conflict
LAND BASED TACAIR					Indian Subcontinent
CARRIER TACAIR					Iran/Iraq
SEA CONTROL FORCES					Embargo

1 - HIGHEST UTILITY

5 - LOWEST UTILITY

FORCES EVALUATION BY CHARACTERISTICS
WHICH ENHANCE POL/MIL OBJECTIVES

CHARACTERISTICS FORCE	FORCES EVALUATION BY CHARACTERISTICS WHICH ENHANCE POL/MIL OBJECTIVES													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
A. LAND BASED GROUND FORCES														
B. SEA BASED GROUND FORCES														
C. LAND BASED TACAIR														
D. CARRIER TACAIR														
E. SEA CONTROL FORCES														

RANKING + IS POSITIVE
0 IS UNCERTAINTY
- IS NEGATIVE
N/A MEANS DOES NOT APPLY

UNDER EITHER ALTERNATIVE
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO FORCES?

- NEED CONSIDERABLE ANALYSIS
- PROBABLY PREMIUM ON:
 - NUMBERS VS QUALITY OF UNITS
 - MOBILITY
- NOT A PRECIPITATE CHANGE OF DIRECTION BUT MAKING THE CHOICES AVAILABLE TO SECDEF WHICH ARE SOMETIMES OBSCURED OR DISTORTED TODAY
- DISTINCTION BETWEEN CURRENT AND FUTURE FORCES

HOW TO IMPLEMENT A CHANGE IN FORCE
PLANNING PROCESS?

I. CHOICE:

CONTINUE PRESCRIPTIVE PLANNING DOCTRINE

OR

ESTABLISH ROUGH, INDICATIVE PLANNING GUIDES

II. MEANS:

- CONTINUE OLD DPPG IN FORCE
- REISSUE DPPG REAFFIRMING NATO FOCUS
- REISSUE DDPG WITHOUT FORCE SIZING APPROACH
- DEVELOP NEW DPPG